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Statutes Limiting Mental Health Professionals'
Liability For The Violent Acts Of Their Patients
In a landmark case, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,
the California Supreme Court held that in some circumstances psychother-
apists can be liable for failing to warn or protect third parties from the
violent acts of the therapists' patients.2 The liability and affirmative duty
which the court imposed are expansive and have ramifications for profes-
sional relationships and circumstances other than those encountered in
Tarasoff.3 Some state legislatures have responded by enacting statutes which
codify and limit the liability of mental health professionals for the violent
acts of their patients. 4 Like Tarasoff, these statutes embody the general
principle that "in some situations, the person most likely to foresee an
1. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
2. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
3. See, e.g., Melella, Travin & Cullen, The Psychotherapist's Third-Party Liability for
Sexual Assaults Committed by His Patients, 15 J. oF PSYCmATRY AND L. 83, 110 (1987)
[hereinafter Melella] (stating that "[i]f courts are willing to find a broadly defined third-party
liability for sexual assaults, the risks to psychotherapists of treating sex offenders on an
outpatient basis ... may be so great as to preclude such treatment"); Sands, The Attorney's
Affirmative Duty to Warn Foreseeable Victims of a Client's Intended Violent Assault, 21 TORT
& INS. L.J. 355 (1986); Student Article, "Bless Me Father, for I am about to Sin . .. ".
Should Clergy Counselors Have a Duty to Protect Third Parties?, 22 TULSA L.J. 139 (1986)
[hereinafter Clergy Counselors]. The Michigan Court of Appeals has held that a requisite
special relationship exists between a physician and patient to support a physician's duty to
third parties to warn or take precautions "where the physician determines or, pursuant to the
standard of care, should determine that his patient poses a serious threat of danger to a third
person." Welke v. Kuzilla, 144 Mich. App. 245, 253-54, 375 N.W.2d 403, 406 (1985).
4. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 43.92 (West Supp. 1988); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987);
IND. CODE Am. §§ 34-4-12.4-1 to -4 (West Supp. 1988); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.400,
645.270 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2 (West Supp.
1988); MnN. STAT. ANN. §§ 148.975-.976 (West Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-
1101 to -1103 (Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329:31, 330-A:22 (Supp. 1987); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-14a-101 to -102 (Supp. 1988); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.120(2) (Supp.
1988). Montana's statute is representative:
Duty to Warn of Violent Behavior. A mental health professional has a duty to
warn of or take reasonable precautions to provide protection from violent
behavior only if the patient has communicated to the mental health professional
an actual threat of physical violence by specific means against a clearly identified
or reasonably identifiable victim. The duty is discharged by a mental health
professional if he has:
(1) made reasonable efforts to communicate the threat to the victim and notify
the law enforcement agency closest to the patient's or the victim's residence
of the threat of violence; and
(2) supplied a requesting law enforcement agency with any information he has
concerning the threat of violence.
Immunity from Liability.
(1) No monetary liability and no cause of action may arise against any mental
health professional for failing to predict, warn of, or take precautions to
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injury should bear the risk of its occurrence and the burden of taking steps
to prevent it.''5 However, by limiting the circumstances under which the
duty to warn or take precautions will be imposed, these statutes also restrict
the Tarasoff rule's potential for expanding the scope of liability for mental
health professionals. 6
This Note will survey the history of mental health professionals' duty to
warn or take precautions as it developed in Tarasoff and later cases, and
the factors which condition this duty under the new statutes. Second, it will
examine potential differences between application of the statutory duty and
common law Tarasoff duty. Third, it will argue that the statutes should be
construed as limiting the circumstances in which mental health professionals
may be liable for the violent acts of their patients. Fourth, it will argue
that the statutes do away with the reasonableness test governing a therapist's
prediction of violence, but they permit using a reasonableness test to
determine the adequacy of a therapist's actions to fulfill the duty to warn
or take precautions. Finally, it will propose a formulation of a statute which
better encompasses the policy judgments which are implicit in these statutes.
As an epilogue, this Note will argue that the history of the Tarasoff duty
holds some lessons about affirmative duties in general. As shown below,
the therapist's duty to warn or take precautions has undergone considerable
development and change. The manner and progress of this metamorphosis
prompt some insight about whether and how to impose affirmative duties
in other situations.
I. THE COMMON LAW AND THE STATUTES
The duty imposed by the Tarasoff line of cases is a "special relationship"
exception to the general rule that one is not liable for the acts of another. 7
provide protection from a patient's threatened violent behavior unless he
has a duty to warn of violent behavior, as provided [above].
(2) No monetary liability and no cause of action may arise against any mental
health professional for disclosing confidential or privileged information in
an effort to discharge a duty arising under [the above section].
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-1101 to -1103 (Supp. 1987).
5. Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasoff for
Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263, 293 (1982).
6. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
7. See RESTATEIMNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 315 (1965). See also Annotation, Comment
Note-Private Person's Duty and Liability for Failure to Protect Another Against Criminal
Attack by Third Person, 10 A.L.R. 3D 619, 626 (1966) (stating that "[a]s a general principle,
and in the absence of special relationships or circumstances, a private person has no duty to
protect another from a criminal attack by a third person"). Prior to Tarasoff, the only two
exceptions to this rule were where a special relationship, "usually custodial, but always
controlling," existed between the actor and the dangerous person, and where the actor had
made an express undertaking to help the victim. Merton, supra note 5, at 291. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315-20 (1965). Compare PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
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Imposing this duty on various mental health service professionals,8 the
statutes also stand within this exception. In Tarasoff, the Supreme Court
of California held that a psychologist may be liable for failing to take steps
to protect a patient's intended victim after the psychologist has predicted,
or reasonably should have predicted, that the patient would do violence to
identifiable persons.9 This case and cases following it have been the subject
of much scholarly criticism and analysis.' 0 One of the frequent criticisms
leveled at the case is the difficulty of keeping the duty and liability confined
to fact situations similar to that found in Tarasoff."
A. Tarasoff and its Progeny
In Tarasoff, the two defendant psychologists treated a patient who had
told them of his intention to kill a former girlfriend. According to the
plaintiffs, the psychologists asked the police to detain the patient, but the
police released him when he appeared rational. The psychologists took no
other action to confine him. Nor did they issue any warning to the woman
he had threatened to kill or to her family. Approximately two months later,
the patient killed the woman as he had threatened. 2
Because the psychologists knew their patient was at large and intended
to kill the woman, the court held that "their failure to warn [her] or others
likely to apprise her of the danger constituted a breach of the therapists'
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect [her]."' 3 This duty was framed
by the court in terms of reasonable care: "[O]nce a therapist does in fact
determine, or under applicable professional standards reasonably should
have determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others,
LAW OF TORTS, § 56, at 383 (W. Page Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON
ON ToRTs] (stating that the duty "to take reasonable precautions for the safety of others may
include the obligation to exercise control over the conduct of third persons," and may arise
in protective and custodial relationships).
8. Categories of professionals covered by these statutes differ from state to state. See
infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
9. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 431, 551 P.2d
334, 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (1976).
10. For examples of such scholarly criticism and analysis, see Schopp & Quattrocchi,
Tarasoff, the Doctrine of Special Relationships, and the Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn, 12
J. PsYCmATRY & L. 13 (1984) (arguing that the special relationships exception in the Restatement
is conceptually unrelated to a psychiatrist's duty to warn); Note, The Scope of a Psychiatrist's
Duty to Third Persons: The Protective Privilege Ends Where the Public Peril Begins, 59 NOTRE
DAmE L. REv. 770 (1984); Note, Discovery of Psychotherapist-Patient Communications after
Tarasoff, 15 SAN Dmc-o L. Ray. 265, 266 n.8 (1978) (listing many other articles and Notes
which discuss and criticize TarasofJ).
11. See Sands, supra note 3; Clergy Counselors, supra note 3.
12. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 430-32, 551 P.2d at 339-41, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19-21.
13. Id. at 431, 551 P.2dat 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
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he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim
of that danger."' 4
The duty which the court thus imposed upon therapists involves two
applications of the standard of reasonable care. First, the therapist must
use reasonable care in applying professional standards to determine whether
there is a "serious danger" that the patient will do violence to others. 5
This opens the possibility of imposing liability on therapists who have not
actually predicted that their patient will harm someone. That is, the therapist
may be liable for the violence which a patient commits against others when
the therapist reasonably should have predicted the violent behavior of the
patient toward others. 6
Second, under the Tarasoff rule a therapist must also use reasonable care
in discharging the duty to warn or protect the potential victim.' 7 This may
demand "one or more of various steps" to be taken by the therapist,
"depending upon the nature of the case."' 8 The court enumerated three
specific steps as alternatives, as well as a catch-all provision. The therapist
may (1) "warn the intended victim;" (2) warn "others likely to apprise the
14. Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
15. Id. The court cited other cases and treatises to formulate the reasonableness standard
to be used in judging a therapist's determination of a patient's dangerousness. "[T]he therapist
need exercise only 'that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed
and exercised by members of [that professional specialty] under similar circumstances."' Id.
(citations omitted).
16. "[O]nce a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable professional standards
reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others,
he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger."
Id. See also id. at 450-52, 551 P.2d at 353-54, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 33-34 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting). Cf. Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 599, 162 Cal. Rptr.
724, 729 (1980).
Responding to amici who claimed that "therapists, in the present state of the art, are unable
reliably to predict violent acts ... and [whose predictions] indeed are more often wrong than
right," the court stated only that it was not requiring perfect accuracy from therapists.
Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 450-52, 551 P.2d at 344-45, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25. According to the
court, "proof, aided by hindsight, that [the therapist] judged wrongly is insufficient to establish
negligence." Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25. This does not answer the
argument that no professional reasonableness standard exists among therapists by which to
decide whether an inaccurate prognosis of violent behavior was negligent, or was merely
mistaken but nevertheless reasonable. However, this statement by the court at least opens the
possibility of shielding therapists from liability in cases where they have made mistakes in a
good faith attempt at correct diagnosis. See White v. United States, 780 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (upholding district court finding that psychiatrist was not negligent by not predicting
patient's violent attack on wife where patient had not acted violently for a year, had no
history of assaults on women, and psychiatrist had considered patient capable of distinguishing
fantasy of harming wife from acting out that fantasy).
For a statutory version of a similar defense covering good faith, but mistaken, breaches of
confidentiality when a patient has made a violent threat, see infra note 97 and accompanying
text.
17. 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
18. Id.
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victim of the danger;" or (3) "notify the police."' 19 More generally, the
therapist must "take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under
the circumstances." 20 The latter alternative opens the possibility of negligence
actions based on a therapist's failure to detain or prevent the release of a
potentially dangerous patient. 21
Justice Mosk, concurring and dissenting, argued that liability should have
been imposed only because the therapists "did in fact predict that [their
patient] would kill and were therefore negligent in failing to warn of that
danger."" In Justice Mosk's view, courts cannot use the Tarasoff majority's
first standard which evaluates therapists' predictions of their patients' vio-
lence. Primarily, his objection was that no such professional standard exists
because "psychiatric predictions of violence are inherently unreliable.'' 2
19. Id.
20. Id. It is important to note that Tarasoff does not necessarily require a warning to be
issued, but only that the therapist use reasonable care to protect the potential victim in whatever
manner reasonable care may require. See Givelber, Bowers & Bitch, Tarasoff, Myth and
Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 WIs. L. Ray. 443 [hereinafter
Empirical Study]. The authors conducted a survey, receiving a 59.5% response. They studied
a sample of 2,875 psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers in eight cities, drawn from
lists of professional associations, classifying and stratifying professional groups into "cells"
created by cross-tabulating geographic, practice and experience factors. Id. at 454-55. According
to the authors, this study suggested that the "respondents believe that there are means other
than warning the victim for satisfying their ethical obligation to potential victims. Yet [the]
respondents misunderstood Tarasoff as requiring them to warn." Id. at 472. Nonetheless,
'many more therapists communicated with public authorities than with potential victims,"
perhaps reflecting "the relative difficulty of locating warnable victims, or a therapist's pref-
erence to discharge his or her obligation for the welfare of others by dealing with public
authorities." Id. at 469. Also, the study found that "therapists feel they pay a higher clinical
price [of compromising their best judgment] by warning than by making other forms of third
party disclosures." Id. at 472. Interestingly, the study also found that extra-therapeutic
communications of patients' threats were not rare even before Tarasoff. Id. at 468.
21. See Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D. Neb. 1980). The court
"refuse[d] to rule as a matter of law that a reasonable therapist would never be required to
take precautions other than warnings, or that there is never a duty to attempt to detain a
patient." See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
22. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 451, 551 P.2d at 353, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 33. According to the
majority, the plaintiffs had alleged that Poddar, the patient, "informed . . . his therapist,
that he was going to kill an unnamed girl, readily identifiable as" the victim, Tatiana Tarasoff,
and that the "therapists did in fact predict that [the patient] would kill." Id. at 432, 438, 551
P.2d at 341, 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21, 25.
23. Id. at 451, 551 P.2d at 354, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 34 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
This remains a point of controversy. The American Psychiatric Association Task Force on
Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual has declared that "[n]either psychiatrists nor anyone
else have reliably demonstrated an ability to predict future violence or 'dangerousness.' Neither
has any special psychiatric 'expertise' in this area been established." Clinical Aspects of the
Violent Individual, 8 AM. PsycIATRic A. TASK FORCE 28 (1974) [hereinafter AM. PsYcMATRc
A. TASK FORCE], quoted in Merton, supra note 5, at 297. Merton also lists many studies
demonstrating psychiatrists' overprediction of violence and concludes that psychiatrists' "pred-
ictions may well be no more reliable than those arrived at by the toss of a coin." Id. at 298
n.81. Others have argued that psychiatrists may be less accurate than other professionals in
predicting violence. See Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 364-65 n.2
1989]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Justice Mosk disagreed that liability should be imposed on therapists who,
according to professional standards, "should have" predicted violence by
their patient.24 Because the unreliability of such predictions results in an
incoherent or nonexistent standard, Justice Mosk argued that the majority's
imposition of such a standard "will take us from the world of reality into
the wonderland of clairvoyance.
' ' 25
The majority's reasonableness standard presents a trier of fact with the
post facto guesswork of determining whether a duty existed to warn or take
precautions. It also presents the professional with the current guesswork of
determining whether the trier of fact will find that the professional reason-
ably applied a phantom standard.2 6 Justice Mosk offered a much narrower
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 326, 535 P.2d 352, 365,
121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 501 (1975). See also Estate of Mathes v. Ireland, 419 N.E.2d 782, 785
n.5 (Ind. App. 1981) (recognizing that "those jurisdictions which permit an action [like
TarasofA ... are careful to define the standard of reasonable care as that due from similar
professionals in a field where there remains considerable uncertainty of diagnosis and tenta-
tiveness of professional judgment"). See also Comment, Psychotherapists' Duty to Warn: Ten
Years after Tarasoff, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 271, 279-80 (1985) (recognizing that
"lt]herapists' confidence may not . . . reflect their abilities" and that "the accuracy of
predictions of dangerousness in Tarasoff outpatient situations remains uncertain"). The Com-
ment also points out that "the existence of discrepancies in the very definition of dangerousness
complicates any attempt to make accurate determinations." Id. at 280.
But see Melella, supra note 3, at 100 (briefly describing some works discussing the opposite
view). See also Empirical Study, supra note 20. "Without taking a position" on the issue
whether therapists are more often wrong than right in predicting violence, the authors point
out that "[s]even out of ten respondents believed that 90-100% of their colleagues would agree
with their conclusion that the patient was dangerous." Id. at 462, 464. They concluded that
"therapists appear to believe that there are objective professional standards for evaluating
dangerousness or, at a minimum, that dangerousness is a little like hard core obscenity in that
they 'know it when they see it,' even if they can't define it." Id. at 464. However, the authors
conceded that "Itihis finding does not mean that therapists can predict future violence or that
their colleagues are correct in agreeing with them." Id. at 486 n.117.
24. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 450-52, 551 P.2d at 353-54, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 33-34 (Mosk,
J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk stated that he "would restructure the rule designed
by the majority to eliminate all reference to conformity to standards of the profession in
predicting violence." Id. at 452, 551 P.2d at 354, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
25. Id. at 452, 551 P.2d at 354, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 34 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
26. See Garvey & Krucks, A Legal Cuckoo's Nest: The Liability of Mental Health
Professionals, COMPLEAT LAWYER, Fall 1986, at 23, 25 (arguing that "[the lack of a precise
definition of the 'reasonable therapist' standard of conduct means it is impossible to predict
when courts will find liability for a patient's behavior"); Comment, From Tarasoff to Brady:
Courts Struggle to Apply the Duty to Control Mental Patients, 14 CUMB. L. REv. 165, 180
(1984) (stating that "[flactors that add to the difficulty of trying to determine if a duty to
control is warranted [under Tarasoff and subsequent cases] include the lack of standards by
which to predict dangerousness").
The uncertainty of the Tarasoff rule and the responsibility it places upon medical practitioners
was expressed by one author considering the potential liability of informing a patient's wife
that the patient had gonorrhea. Under Tarasoff, "there is increasing judicial recognition that
there are times when overriding societal concerns, such as public safety or education," may
require the physician to break confidentiality. Britton, Confidentiality in Family Practice,
MEDIcAL AsPEcTs OF HUM. SEXUALITY, May 1987, at 59, 60. "To date these concerns have
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alternative rule: "If a psychiatrist does in fact predict violence, then a duty
to warn arises." 27 This rule, however, provides practitioners with an easy
escape hatch. 2 Fearing violent actions by a patient, the professional need
only avoid making an explicit prediction of violence to escape liability for
a failure to warn or take precautions. Thus, professionals themselves would
control the imposition of the duty to warn or take precautions and could
avoid triggering the duty even in those cases where victims could be saved
by reasonable steps.
Justice Clark dissented for two reasons. First, in Justice Clark's view,
the majority's rule would result in a net increase in violence and a loss of
patients' liberty rights. 29 Second, Justice Clark argued that "[tihe issue
whether effective treatment for the mentally ill should be sacrificed to a
system of warnings is ... properly one for the Legislature."30 According
to Justice Clark, the California legislature had already balanced the com-
peting interests involved in the issue of overriding confidentiality to enhance
public safety." In doing so, the legislature had weighed patients' rights,
public safety and the harmful effects which disclosure has on effective
treatment.32 At least as to persons committed to institutions, the legislature
had bound psychotherapists not to disclose any information about their
patients, except within narrowly defined circumstances. 33 Since none of these
limited situations applied in Tarasoff, the therapists were in a dilemma:
They must violate either the statute or the new duty imposed by the Tarasoff
been determined on a case-by-case basis, with each court drawing individual conclusions based
on the specific scenario presented." Id. The conclusion was startling: "[B]ear in mind that
you [the practitioner] must achieve a balance between individual and social welfare by weighing
the need for preserving patient confidentiality against the overriding duty to uphold the public
interest in matters of safety and health." Id. (emphasis added).
27. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 452, 551 P.2d at 354, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 34 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting). Compare Estate of Mathes, 419 N.E.2d at 785 (a "negligent release" case
holding that if either of two defendant-psychiatric centers had taken charge of the patient
"and additionally had actual knowledge that [the patient] was extremely dangerous, ... they
were bound to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances") (emphasis added).
28. For evidence that Justice Mosk's application of this rule prevents its use as an escape
hatch, see infra note 54.
29. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 458, 463, 551 P.2d at 358, 362, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 38, 42
(Clark, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 452, 551 P.2d at 355, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (Clark, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 457, 551 P.2d at 358, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 38 (Clark, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 454-55, 463-64, 551 P.2d at 355-56, 362, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36, 42 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
33. Id. at 454, 551 P.2d at 355, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (Clark, J., dissenting). According to
Justice Clark, a therapist could first disclose the fact of treatment to a family member if the
therapist had determined that this would be in the patient's best interest. Second, a therapist
was also permitted to disclose a patient's threats to police if such action was necessary to
protect elected officials and their families. Finally, a therapist could disclose the fact of a
patient's disappearance from an institution to police or the patient's family if this was necessary
to protect the patient or others. Id. at 455, 551 P.2d at 356, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37 (Clark,
J., dissenting).
1989]
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majority. 34 In Justice Clark's view, the majority had "an obligation to
specifically enumerate the circumstances under which the [legislative act]
applies as opposed to the circumstances when 'general tort principles' will
govern."
35
Intermediate appellate courts in California began to fine tune the Tarasoff
rule and to expand its applicability.3 6 In Mavroudis v. Superior Court,37 the
California Court of Appeal held that Tarasoff did not require a prediction
of violence toward a particular person before the duty to warn or take
precautions would arise. 3 According to the court, "the intended victim need
not be specifically named by the patient," but need only be "readily
identifiable." 3 9 No independent interrogation of the patient or investigation
about the possible victim's identity is required before the duty will arise to
protect that victim. Rather, under Mavroudis, the duty arises in cases where
"a 'moment's reflection' will reveal the victim's identity."''4
The issue of the required specificity of the victim's identity was again
considered in Thompson v. County of Alameda.4 1 In that case the California
Supreme Court held that "the duty to warn depends upon and arises from
the existence of a prior threat to a specific identifiable victim." 42 The court
found "no affirmative duty to warn of the release of an inmate with a
violent history who has made nonspecific threats of harm directed at
nonspecific persons. ' 43 The court found too many troubles and too little
effectiveness in imposing a duty to warn police, neighborhood parents or
the patient's parents when the patient's intended victims were merely "mem-
34. Id. at 457, 551 P.2d at 358, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 38 (Clark, J., dissenting).
35. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
36. See, e.g., Mavroudis, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 62 Cal. Rptr. 724; Thompson v. County
of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980).
37. 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724. In Mavroudis, the plaintiffs successfully
compelled discovery of the psychiatric records of their son who had attacked them with a
hammer while being treated by the defendant-psychiatrists.
38. Id. at 599, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
39. Id. See also Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that
a readily identifiable victim or group is not defined "solely on a statistical probability that
the more one [is with a patient] the more likely it is that one would be a victim of any violent
outbreak by [the patient]"), aff'd, 676 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1982).
40. 102 Cal. App. 3d at 600, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (quoting Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439
n.ll, 551 P.2d at 345 n.ll, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.ll).
41. 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70. In Thompson, plaintiffs' son was
murdered by a juvenile who had been released from a county institution after having "indicated
that he would, if released, take the life of a young child residing in the neighborhood."
However, the patient had not indicated any specific child as an intended victim. Id. at 746,
614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
42. Id. at 758, 614 P. 2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80. See also Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d
20 (Minn. 1982). In that case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota did not decide the question
whether a duty to warn exists, but stated that "if a duty to warn exists, it does so only when
specific threats are made against specific victims." Id. at 26.
43. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 753, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77 (emphasis in
original).
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ber[s] of [a] large amorphous public group of potential targets" and not
''precise" or "specifically known and designated individuals.'' "
In other cases involving premature release or failure to detain a patient,
courts have imposed liability on psychotherapists even when there was no
victim specified by the patient. In Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 41 the
plaintiff sued doctors who had released a patient who killed her husband
and wounded her." The federal district court held that the doctors could
be liable because their duty was not limited to warning, but included
whatever precautions were reasonably necessary, including commitment or
detention of the patient. 47 Acknowledging that a therapist's duty runs to
those persons foreseeably endangered, the court also held that the category
of persons who may need to be warned includes potential victims not
specified by the patient. 4
The application of the Tarasoff rule reached its nadir in Hedlund v.
Superior Court.49 In that case, the California Supreme Court held that the
duty of psychotherapists is broad enough to include warning or protecting
members of a victim's family or others who foreseeably are in close
proximity to the victim.5 0 In Hedlund, the victim was shot by a man who
had previously been in therapy with her. During the attack, the victim threw
herself over her three-year-old son, seated next to her, saving his life. The
son alleged that "because it was foreseeable that [the patient's] threats, if
carried out, posed a risk of harm to bystanders and particularly to those
in close relationship to [the victim]," the duty of the psychotherapists to
warn or take precaution extended to him.51 The California Supreme Court
held that these allegations stated a cause of action against the psychother-
apists.-2
44. Id. at 755, 758, 614 P.2d at 736, 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 78, 80. Governmental immunity
was a separate basis for finding no liability. Id. at 748, 614 P.2d at 731, 167 Cal. Rptr. at
73. "Thus a state may be willing to impose liability upon a private psychologist who fails to
warn others that he has a potentially violent patient, but may interpose the protection of the
basic policy immunity when the state gives a furlough to a known violent criminal who has
every prospect of raping and murdering a child and who in fact does so." PROSSER AND
KEEaoN ON ToRTs, supra note 7, § 131, at 1046 (footnotes omitted).
45. 497 F. Supp. 185.
46. The patient was an outpatient who stopped his treatment despite the advice of his
doctors. The plaintiff claimed that the doctors should have detained or committed the patient.
Id. at 187.
47. Id. The court "refuse[d] to rule as a matter of law that a reasonable therapist would
never be required to take precautions other than warnings, or that there is never a duty to
attempt to detain a patient." Id.
48. The court held that the defendants could be held liable if the plaintiffs proved that
the defendants reasonably could have foreseen that there was risk to the plaintiffs or "a class
of persons of which the [plaintiffs] were members." Id. at 195. Furthermore, the plaintiffs
did not need to prove that the defendants knew the intended victim's identity. Id.
49. 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1983).
50. Id. at 705, 669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
51. Id. at 705, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
52. Id. at 707, 669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
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Justice Mosk dissented, again arguing that psychotherapists have no
reliable predictive capabilities, and that no professional standard exists
whereby to decide whether a psychotherapist was negligent by not predicting
the violent behavior of a patient. 3 Applying his own proposed rule-the
actual prediction of violence standard-Justice Mosk argued that the ma-
jority's "expansive view of the duty of defendants is probably unnecessary
to the result," since the defendant psychologists had actual knowledge of
the patient's intent to attack the victim. 5 4
Despite vigorous objections and scholarly criticism of the majority's
standard, the Tarasoff rule was adopted in other jurisdictions in both
expanded and limited forms. 5 Not all jurisdictions, however, have adopted
the Tarasoff duty.5 6 Moreover, while therapists are generally aware of the
53. Id. at 707-10, 669 P.2d at 48-50, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 812-14 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 710, 669 P.2d at 49, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (Mosk, J., dissenting). This points
out an ambiguity in Justice Mosk's statement of his rule. Although the psychotherapists had
knowledge 'of the patient's threat, there was no evidence that the psychotherapists had used
this knowledge to predict violence by the patient. Justice Mosk's argument here implies that
where psychotherapists know of threats by their patients, they will be deemed to have made
the required prediction and the duty to warn or take precautions will arise.
55. For examples of cases adopting the Tarasoff rule, see Durflinger v. Artiles, 234 Kan.
484, 673 P.2d 86 (1983); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1979). For examples of cases adopting a modified version of Tarasoff, see
Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that a "psychological
profile indicat[ing] that [the patient's] violence was likely to be directed against women very
close to him" can be a sufficiently specific identification of a victim to support imposing a
duty to warn on the therapists); Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983)
(stating that it is only "once the patient verbalizes his intentions and directs his threats to
identifiable victims, [that] ... the therapist has a duty to protect those third parties from the
threatened harm"), aff'd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984); Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 194-95
(holding that under Nebraska law the Tarasoff duty would be limited to reasonably foreseeable
victims or "a class of persons of which the [plaintiffs] were members").
Because of the rapid expansion of therapists' duties, these cases and others have been taken
by some courts as placing a duty on therapists to protect society in general. See, e.g., Leverett
v. Ohio, 61 Ohio App. 2d 35, 40-41, 399 N.E.2d 106, 110 (1978) (holding that a mental
hospital has a duty to the public when considering a patient's release and may be held liable
for negligent discharge if it knew or reasonably should have known the patient could do harm
when released). See also Melella, supra note 3, at 93. But see Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d
661, 664 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (holding that physicians owe no duty to the general public
when deciding whether to release involuntarily committed patients). The court in Sherrill did
not want physicians to
have to function under the threat of civil liability to members of the general
public when making decisions about passes and releases .... The effect would
be [that] treating physicians would indulge every presumption in favor of further
restraint, out of fear of being sued. Such a climate is not in the public interest.
Id.
56. The Iowa Supreme Court has discussed the Tarasoff duty to warn or take precautions
but has not yet explicitly adopted it. See Anthony v. State, 374 N.W.2d 662, 668 (Iowa 1985)
(not recognizing the Tarasoff duty in this case because "[s]uch far-reaching and sensitive issues
will be better decided in a case in which they are dispositive"); In re Estate of Votteler, 327
N.W.2d 759, 760-62 (Iowa 1982); Cole v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1981). Neither
have the Maryland courts accepted or rejected a duty of psychiatrists to warn specifically
[Vol. 64:391
LIABILITY-LIMITING STATUTES
Tarasoff rule, there is confusion among them about what it requires and
in what jurisdictions it is applicable.57 As one commentator puts it, "The
result is that there is a great deal of confusion among psychotherapists
about what their duty is to potential third-party victims." ' 5 Moreover, the
potentially broad liability which therapists face under Tarasoff and its
progeny may contribute to the growing expense and difficulty of obtaining
professional malpractice insurance.5 9
B. The Statutes
Responding to the confusion and increased liability for therapists caused
by the expanding Tarasoff duty, ° ten states have enacted statutes codifying
identifiable victims. See Furr v. Spring Grove State Hospital, 53 Md. App. 474, 487, 454 A.2d
414, 420 (1983); Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 725, 415 A.2d 625, 630 (1980). More
speculatively, the Texas Court of Appeals declined to find a breach of such a duty in one
case, but based its decision on the "logic" of Tarasoff and Thompson without explicitly
adopting the rule in those cases. Williams v. Sun Valley Hospital, 723 S.W.2d 783, 787 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987).
57. Melella, supra note 3, at 99. See also Empirical Study, supra note 20. In a formal,
jurisdictional sense, Tarasoff does not apply to all psychotherapists everywhere, and outside
of those jurisdictions explicitly recognizing or rejecting that duty, the best description is that
Tarasoff "is potentially the law everywhere." Id. at 474. The study, however, showed that
"[m]ost respondents seem to have a fairly good understanding of the jurisdictional issue, but
a majority of them nonetheless believed themselves bound by Tarasoff, with therapists outside
of California "evenly divided on the question." Id. Many therapists also mistakenly believe
that Tarasoff requires a warning, as opposed to other means of precaution. See supra note
20.
58. Melella, supra note 3, at 89. See also George, Korin, Quattrone & Mandel, The
Therapist's Duty to Protect Third Parties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 637,
651 (1983) (concluding, after reviewing contemporaneous cases, that "until further cases refine
the factual circumstances under which a therapist will be held liable for failure to warn others,
there can be no complete guide for the perplexed").
59. King, Are Therapists Liable for Their Patients' Violence?, STATE LEGIsLArTurEs, Feb.
1988, at 19, 19. There has also been speculation that students avoid entering the practice of
psychiatry because of apprehension "based upon the perception that the respective rights and
responsibilities of both the psychiatrist and the patient have been made so ambiguous by the
legal system that the practitioner is left without meaningful guidance concerning the legally
permitted boundaries of clinical conduct." Kapp, Editor's Page, 10 J. oF PsycH. AND L. 131,
131 (1982). Admitting that no empirical studies yet supported this speculation, Kapp argues
that even superficial contact with the profession reveals its high level of anxiety over uncertain
legal liability, and this "supports reference to this anxiety as one potential explanation of the
current psychiatric shortage." Id. at 132. Kapp suggests a number of actions which could
counteract this anxiety, including authoring "objective and even-handed articles" about mental
health professionals' liability. Id.
60. In Colorado, at least, the legislative action was prompted by associations of mental
health professionals because malpractice insurance for mental health professionals was becoming
more expensive and difficult to find. The associations believed that legislation could be used
more precisely to delineate under what circumstances therapists would be responsible for actions
by their patients. Another concern of the legislators was the uncertainty of holding therapists
liable for malpractice when engaging in an inexact science. King, supra note 59, at 19-21.
Compare Act approved Feb. 8, 1988, ch. 88-1, § 10, 1988 FLA. SEss. LAw SERv. 1, 12
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the duty of mental health professionals to protect against violent acts by
their patients. The statutes address the issues through a variety of ap-
proaches. Statutes have been enacted in California, Colorado, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Utah and
Washington. 6'
(West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 455.2415). This recently enacted Florida statute creates
an exception to patient-psychiatrist confidentiality when the patient makes a threat of violence
to others. Id. In part, the Florida legislature was prompted to pass this statute by finding "a
financial crisis in the medical liability insurance industry" in which "the cost of medical
liability insurance is excessive and injurious to the people of Florida and must be reduced."
Id. at 3. See also infra note 94.
61. See supra note 4.
Indiana's statute is the most comprehensive. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-12.4-I to -4 (West
Supp. 1988) reads in full:
Chapter 12.4. Immunity and Privileged Communications: Mental Health Service
Providers.
Sec. 1. As used in this chapter, "mental health service provider" means any of
the following:
(1) A physician licensed under IC 25-22.5.
(2) A hospital licensed under IC 16-10-1.
(3) A private institution licensed under IC 16-13-2.
(4) A psychologist licensed under IC 25-33.
(5) A school psychologist licensed by the state board of education.
(6) A university or college counseling center under the direction of a licensed
psychologist, physician or mental health professional.
(7) A registered nurse or licensed practical nurse licensed under IC 25-23.
(8) A social worker who meets the criteria for membership in the Academy
of Certified Social Workers.
(9) A partnership, a corporation, or a professional corporation, as defined in
IC 23-1.5-1-10, whose partners or shareholders are mental health service
providers described in subdivisions (1) through (6).
(10) A community mental health center, as defined in IC 16-16-1-1.
(11) A program for the treatment, care, or rehabilitation of alcohol abusers
or drug abusers that is:
(A) certified under IC 16-13-6.1-4; or
(B) created and funded under IC 16-13-6.1-30 or IC 16-13-6.1-31.
(12) A state mental health institution described in IC 16-13-1-9(a).
See. 2. A mental health service provider is immune from civil liability to persons
other than the patient for failing to:
(1) predict; or
(2) warn or take precautions to protect from;
a patient's violent behavior unless the patient has communicated to the
provider of mental health services an actual threat of physical violence or
other means of harm against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims,
or evidences conduct or makes statements indicating an imminent danger
that the patient will use physical violence or use other means to cause
serious personal injury or death to others.
Sec. 3. The duty to warn of or to take precautions to provide protection from
violent behavior or other serious harm arises only under the limited circumstances
specified in section 2 of this chapter. The duty is discharged by a mental health
service provider who takes one (1) or more of the following actions:(1) Makes reasonable attempts to communicate the threat to the victim or
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The new statutes limit the civil liability of mental health care providers
for failing to predict violence by their patients and for failing to warn or
take precautions to protect other people from this violence. Generally, a
duty arises upon the mental health professional to warn or take precautions
against violence by a patient only when a patient has communicated a threat
to the professional. 62 Under most of the statutes, if a mental health service
professional is forced to disclose confidential information in order to
discharge this duty, the professional is immune from liability under other
statutes which protect patient confidentiality.6
The ten statutes are distinguished from the Tarasoff line of cases and
from one another by four factors: (1) who is subject to the duty to warn
or take precautions, (2) the type of threats which will activate the duty, (3)
the required identifiability of the victim, and (4) the proper means of
discharging the duty.
1. Who is Subject to the Duty
The first difference is upon whom the duty is placed and to whom the
immunity is given. All of the statutes cover psychologists, and all but one
cover psychiatrists. 64 In addition, five-Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, Mon-
victims.
(2) Makes reasonable efforts to notify a police department or other law
enforcement agency having jurisdiction in the patient's or victim's place
of residence.
(3) Seeks civil commitment of the patient under IC 16-14-9.1.
(4) Takes steps reasonably available to such provider to prevent the patient
from using physical violence or other means of harm to others until the
appropriate law enforcement agency can be summoned and takes custody
of the patient.
(5) Reports the threat of physical violence or other means of harm, within a
reasonable period of time after receiving knowledge of the threat, to a
physician or psychologist who is designated by the employer of a mental
health service provider as an individual who has the responsibility to warn
under this chapter.
Sec. 4. A mental health service provider who discloses information that must be
disclosed to comply with sections 2 through 3 of this chapter is immune from
civil and criminal liability under Indiana statutes that protect patient privacy and
confidentiality.
62. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-12.4-2, -3
(Vest Supp. 1988).
63. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-4 (West Supp.
1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2(A), (C) (West Supp. 1988); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
202A.400(3), 645.270(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.975(4)
(West Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1103 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
329:31(111), 330-A:22(III) (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14a-102(2) (Supp. 1988).
64. CA . CrV. CODE § 43.92 (West Supp. 1988) (imposing duty on psychotherapists) (CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1010 (West Supp. 1988) defines psychotherapist as psychiatrists; psychologists;
social workers; school psychologists; marriage, family and child counselors and counseling
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tana and New Hampshire-also place the duty upon physicians.65 Some
states also cover interns and assistants working under the supervision of
psychologists, psychiatrists and physicians.6 Social workers6 and registered
interns; psychological assistants and apprentice social workers); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-117
(1987) (imposing duty on physicians, social workers, psychiatric nurses, psychologists, mental
health professionals, mental health hospitals, community mental health clinics, institutions and
their staffs); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.400(1), 645.270 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988)
(imposing duty on "qualified mental health professionals" and.on any "person serving in a
counselor role" when the patient is a "child") (Id. §§ 202A.011(11), 645.020(38) defines
"qualified mental health professional" as including physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists,
psychiatric nurses and social workers) (Id. § 645.020(5) defines "child" for purposes of §
645.270 as one under 18 years of age who is covered by the Mental Health Act of the Unified
Juvenile Code); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2(A) (West Supp. 1988) (imposing duty on
psychologists and psychiatrists); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.975 (West Supp. 1988) (imposing
duty on psychologists, school psychologists, nurses, chemical dependency counselors and social
workers); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1101 to -1103 (1987) (imposing duty on physicians,
professional counselors, psychologists, social workers and "certified professional[s]") (Id. §
53-21-106(1), -101(1) defines "certified professional" as one certified to care for those who
are "seriously mentally ill or suffering from a mental disorder"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
329:31 (Supp. 1987) (imposing duty on physicians and persons treating patients under a
physician's supervision); Id. § 330-A:22 (imposing duty on psychologists or "certified" persons
[including psychiatrists] and persons treating patients under their supervision); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-14a-102 (Supp. 1988) (imposing the duty on therapists) (Id. § 78-14a-101()-(4)
defines "therapist" as psychiatrists, psychologists, marriage and family therapists, social
workers, and psychiatric and mental health nurses licensed to practice advanced psychiatric
nursing); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.120(2) (Supp. 1988) (affirming the existence of the
duty to warn or take precautions). The Washington statute declares that it "does not relieve
a person from ... the duty to warn or take precautions." Id. It is unclear to whom "person"
refers, but § 71.05.120(1) applies to officers of public and private hospitals or treatment
facilities for the mentally ill, the facilities themselves, their attending staff or persons in charge,
officials administering mental illness laws, designated mental health professionals, the state or
its subdivisions. See id. § 71.05.020 (defining the applicable persons and situations).
The Indiana statute covers psychologists and other professionals and professional groups,
but not psychiatrists explicitly. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-1(1) to (12) (West Supp. 1988).
In the chapters governing state psychiatric hospitals, the Indiana Code separately defines a
psychiatrist as a person licensed to practice medicine and "certified by the American Board
of Psychiatry and Neurology, Incorporated, or who is eligible for such certification." IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-14-1-1(8) (West 1984).
65. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-1(1) (West Supp.
1988); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.011(1l)(a), 202A.400, 645.270 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1101(2) (1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 329:31 (Supp.
1987). The courts in at least one jurisdiction have recently held that physicians owe a duty of
reasonable care to protect third parties potentially harmed by their patients. Welke v. Kuzilla,
144 Mich. App. 245, 253-54, 375 N.W.2d 403, 406 (1985).
66. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1010(f), (g) (West Supp. 1988); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 329:31(IV),
330-A:22(IV) (Supp. 1987). Washington and Colorado also cover staff members of certain
mental health care facilities, and thus may also impose the duty on interns or assistants who
are often considered staff of such institutions. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.120(2) (Supp. 1988).
67. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1010(c) (West Supp. 1988); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-1(8) (West Supp. 1988); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.400(11),
600.020(38) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.975(c) (West Supp.
1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1101(5) (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14a-101(4) (Supp.
1988).
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nurses or psychiatric nurses68 also are covered by a majority of the states.
Professional counselors are covered in four states69 and school psychologists
in three.70
Two of the statutes cover a very broad category of professionals. Indiana
covers all of the professionals listed above and adds licensed practical
nurses.71 In addition, Indiana places the duty upon a number of legal
entities, including university and college counseling centers, community
mental health centers, addiction rehabilitation programs, all of the state's
mental hospitals, and partnerships, corporations and professional corpora-
tions whose members are any of the professionals covered by the statute.
7 2
Colorado's law covers mental health hospitals, centers, clinics, institutions,
and their staffs.
73
2. The Type of Threats Which Activate the Duty
A second feature of the statutes is the conditioning of the duty to warn
or take precautions upon the patient's expression of a violent threat. All
of the states require a threat by the patient of "physical violence" to
another person.74 More importantly, in all of the states except Indiana, it
is only when a threat of physical violence against some other person is
"communicated" to the professional that the duty will arise.7" "Commu-
68. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-1(7) (West Supp.
1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.400, 645.020(38) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988);
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 148.975(c) (West Supp. 1988); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 329:31(IV),
330-A:22(IV) (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14a-101(5) (Supp. 1988); WAsH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 71.05.020(8) (Supp. 1988).
69. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1010(e) (West Supp. 1988); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 645.270 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 148.975(c) (West Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-1103(3) (West Supp. 1988).
70. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1010(d) (West Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-1(5) (West
Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.975(c) (West Supp. 1988).
71. IN . CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-1(7) (West Supp. 1988).
72. Id. § 34-4-12.4-1(6), (9)-(12). Such institutions may be held liable through respondeat
superior. See, e.g., Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 348, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 28; Estate
of Mathes, 419 N.E.2d at 786.
73. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987). Washington's statute may also impose the duty
on some institutions since the section as a whole also deals with institutions, but the subsection
which affirms the duty mentions only "persons." See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.120
(Supp. 1988).
74. See supra note 4. New Hampshire also includes "a serious threat of substantial damage
to real property." N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 329:31(I), 330-A:22(I) (Supp. 1987). This differs
from the Tarasoff line of cases which limited the duty to warn about physical harm to persons
and excluded property damage. See BeIlah v. Greenson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 911, 141 Cal. Rptr.
92 (1977), aff'd on rehearing, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1978).
75. See supra note 4. Under the broadly-worded Indiana statute, the duty arises if the
patient "evidences conduct or makes statements indicating an imminent danger that the patient
will use physical violence or use other means to cause serious personal injury or death to
others." IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-2 (West Supp. 1988). Under this clause the duty could
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nicated" seems to imply some assertive verbal or written conduct. Some
states require this to be an "actual" threat, which also connotes assertive
conduct. 76 Other states require a "serious" threat. 77 Some statutes are also
triggered by threats of "imminent" violence, 78 or physical violence "by
specific means, ' 79 or a "serious, specific threat." 0
Louisiana's statute is the most detailed. It requires "an immediate threat
of physical violence ... coupled with the apparent intent and ability to
carry out that threat. '"81 This formula provides a means to filter out
mechanical responses to the statute. It prevents unnecessary breaches of
confidentiality in cases of specifically expressed threats which a therapist
knows the patient cannot carry out.
3. The Identifiability of the Victim
A third distinguishing characteristic of these statutes is the requisite
identifiability of the potential victim. Most of the statutes incorporate a
arise even in the event of non-assertive statements or conduct by the patient which would
indicate a danger to third parties. This addition to the statute covers instances when a patient
may pose a danger to others, but has not assertively verbalized a threat. In these cases,
threatening activity, though non-assertive, will still trigger the duty to warn or take precautions
and the immunity from liability for breaking confidentiality. Thus, the possible circumstances
of liability are broader under the Indiana statute than under the other statutes.
For example, consider a patient with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) who
has a spouse or has made statements indicating that the patient is having regular sexual
relations with someone. Even without actually threatening to infect them with the AIDS virus,
the patient may be exhibiting sufficient "conduct" or making "statements" indicating that
the patient will use sexual intercourse as "other [nonviolent] means" to harm another person.
Id. A physician who has a patient with AIDS, therefore, may have a duty under the Indiana
statute to inform the patient's partner of the presence of the disease. Some commentators
beleive that this may also be the result under Tarasoff. Annas & Davison, The HIV-Positive
Patient Who Won't Tell the Spouse, MEDIcAL ASPECTS OF HUmAN SEXUALTY, March 1987,
at 16, 16 (relying on Tarasoff and the common law regarding a physician's duty to inform
family members and others likely to be exposed about a patient's contagious or infectious
disease). Under the other, more restrictive statutes physicians would not be exposed to liability
unless the patient makes an "actual" or "serious" threat to infect the partner, and unless the
threat of being infected with AIDS is interpreted as "physical violence." See infra text
accompanying notes 76-81. Liability could still be the result under general rules about
physicians' responsibilities when a patient has an infectious or contagious disease. See 70
C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 88 (1987); 61 AM. JuR. 2d Physicians, Surgeons § 245
(1981).
76. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-2 (West Supp. 1988); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.400(l),
645.270(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1102 (1987); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-14a-102(I) (1988); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.120(2) (Supp. 1988).
77. CAL. Crv. CODE § 43.92(a) (West Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.975 (West Supp. 1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 329:31(I), 330-
A:22(I) (Supp. 1987). It is unclear whether "serious" refers to the harm to be done (serious
bodily injury) or to the threat itself (a threat which is to be taken seriously), or both. Since
the statutes require a serious threat of violence, the latter reading is the most plausible
interpretation. The former reading would be more readily acceptable if the statutes instead
required "threats of serious violence."
78. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987).
79. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1102 (1987).
80. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.975(2) (West Supp. 1988).
81. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2 (West 1987).
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standard that the victim be reasonably identifiable, similar to the Tarasoffi
Mavroudis requirement of a readily identifiable victim. 2 Some of the statutes
explicitly include threats made about "clearly identified" 3 or "specific,
clearly identified or identifiable" victims.84 However, Colorado and Louis-
iana limit their statutes' coverage to include only threats made about
"specific" or "clearly" identified victims, respectively. s5 Kentucky, on the
other hand, requires no identifiable potential victim. 6
4. Discharging the Duty
Finally, on the issue of discharging the duty, the statutes fall into two
classes: (1) statutes which mandate specific action by the professional, and
(2) statutes which allow the professional to choose between specified alter-
natives.8 7 California, Louisiana, Montana, Utah and Washington require
the professional to make efforts to inform both the potential victim and
law enforcement persons. 8 In Colorado the professional must inform both
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(a) (West Supp. 1988) (requiring a reasonably identifiable
victim); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-2 (West Supp. 1988) (including a reasonably identifiable
victim); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 329:31(I), 330-A:22(I) (Supp. 1987) (requiring a clearly
identified or reasonably identifiable victim); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1102 (1987) (requiring
a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14a-102(1) (Supp.
1988) (requiring a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.05.120(2) (Supp. 1988) (requiring a reasonably identifiable victim). However, the Tarasoff
and Mavroudis courts interpreted "readily identifiable" to include "cases in which a 'moment's
reflection' will reveal the victim's identity." See Mavroudis, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 600, 162
Cal. Rptr. at 729 (quoting Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439 n.11, 551 P.2d at 345 n.11, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 25 n.11). This judicial standard may be narrower than the statutory standard of
.. reasonably" identifiable.
83. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2800.2(A) (West Supp. 1988) (requiring a clearly identified
victim); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 329:31(1); 330-A:22(I) (Supp. 1987) (requiring a clearly
identified or reasonably identifiable victim); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1102 (1987) (requiring
a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14a-102(l) (Supp.
1988) (requiring a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim).
84. MtNN. STAT. Am. § 148.975(2) (West Supp. 1988).
85. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987); LA. RE. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2 (West Supp.
1988). These formulations seem to reject the Mavroudis/Hedlund rule that the duty may arise
when the victim is only reasonably identifiable whether or not specifically or clearly identified
by the patient.
86. Kentucky's statutes are an exception and do not require an identifiable victim for the
duty to warn or take precautions to arise. The duty to warn or take precautions arises when
the patient makes a threat against a "clearly identified or reasonably identifiable" victim, or
when the patient threatens "some specific violent act." KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 202(A).400(1),
645.270(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988). Also, in an amending provision, the statutes
later state that the duty to warn may be discharged by informing the police when the patient
has made "an actual threat of some specific violent act and no particular victim is identifiable."
Id. §§ 202A.400(2), 645.270(2). This latter provision also implies that the duty to warn may
arise even when there is no identifiable victim.
87. All of the statutes require "reasonable efforts" to carry out the activities needed to
discharge the duty. See supra note 4. Colorado requires "reasonable and timely" efforts.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987).
88. CAL. Crv. CODE § 43.92(b) (West Supp. 1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2 (West
Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE Aim. § 27-1-1102 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14a-102(1) (Supp.
1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.120(2) (Supp. 1988).
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the potential victim and the police, or take other "appropriate action,
including but not limited to, hospitalizing the patient." '8 9 Similarly, under
the Kentucky statute the professional may notify the potential victim and
the police or commit the patient.9 New Hampshire and Minnesota, on the
other hand, require a professional who has received a threat to inform
either the victim or the police nearestthe patient or the victim.9'
In Indiana a professional may take any one of five possible actions to
discharge the duty: (1) inform the victim; (2) inform the police who have
jurisdiction over the patient or the victim; (3) seek to have the patient
committed; (4) use "steps reasonably available to such provider to prevent
the patient from using physical violence or other means of harm to others"
until the police can take custody of the patient; or (5) report the threat to
a physician or psychologist designated by the professional's employer as the
person who has the responsibility to warn. 92 Thus, while the Indiana statute
is the broadest statute in the options it gives the care provider, its language
fits the narrower paradigm which requires the provider to do only one act
in order to fulfill the duty.
Interestingly, the last option-reporting the threat to a designated physi-
cian or psychologist-makes possible an arrangement whereby some of the
individuals and institutions covered by the Indiana statute may further limit
their chances of being held liable for violent acts by patients. By designating
an individual as the channel through which communicated threats are
engaged, a mental health service employer can set up a system whereby all
communicated threats are passed on to one person. This designee can then
develop a proficiency over the legal requirements of a particular jurisdiction
about when a duty to warn or take precautions arises and what actions
must be taken in response. By a simple rule that all patient threats be
communicated to this designee, a mental health service employer is freed
of the difficulty, time and expense of educating many employees to master
what can be complex, intricate and sometimes confusing rules. This would
be especially helpful under a statute such as Indiana's which places the duty
to warn or take precautions on health institutions which employ many
individual professionals. 93
89. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987).
90. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.400(2), 645.270(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988).
Notifying the police is sufficient when the patient has not identified a particular victim. Id.
91. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 329:31(11), 330-A:22(II) (Supp. 1987) (stating that the
professional may discharge the duty by warning the victim, notifying the police, or obtaining
the patient's civil commitment); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.975(l)(e) (West Supp. 1988) (stating
that a professional can discharge the duty by informing the police when a potential victim
cannot be reached).
92. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-3 (West Supp. 1988).
93. The Indiana statute requires that the individual to whom threats are channeled be a
physician or psychologist. Id. § 34-4-12.4-3(5). It is not clear why the designee must be a
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C. The Statutes Compared to the Common Law
From this analysis four significant differences appear among all the
statutes and the Tarasoff line of cases. The statutes provide a solution to
the legal dilemma between breaching confidentiality and giving a warning
or taking precautions. Moreover, the statutes do not have explicit reason-
ableness standards regarding when the duty to warn or take precautions
arises and what actions the professional should choose to fulfill this duty.
First, most of the statutes grant immunity to therapists who break
confidentiality in order to discharge the duty to warn. 94 This prevents the
dilemma, recognized by Justice Clark, which confronts psychotherapists
under Tarasoff.95 By an explicit grant of immunity, the statutes shield
therapists from a draconian choice between fulfilling a statutory duty to
preserve confidence or a Tarasoff-like duty to reveal. Some statutes go
further. In addition to immunity from actions for damages, Colorado grants
immunity from "professional discipline" for breaking confidentiality in
discharge of the duty to warn or take precautions.9 6 Minnesota grants
immunity from liability for disclosures made "in a good-faith effort" to
discharge the duty to warn or take precautions. 97 This affords mental health
professionals some breathing space in which to avoid the disclose-reveal
dilemma in close cases.
Second, no professional reasonableness standard determines when the
duty arises under the statutes. 8 Under the Tarasoff line of cases, the
existence of the duty depends upon the operation of a standard of reason-
member of one of these two professions, especially when any particular employee, such as a
social worker, may be adequately qualified for this responsibility in the employer's estimation.
See also Empirical Study, supra note 20. The study found that .'notifying superiors' rather
than exercising reasonable care is the second most frequently identified behavior thought to
be required by Tarasoff. " Id. at 466. The authors also stated that "[t]his is extremely specific
behavior which is not required by the Tarasoff decision, but it may represent exactly what
administrative personnel in a mental health setting would want a therapist to do," and that
"[t]herapists who are troubled by how to respond to a particular violent patient may also find
notifying a superior to be a congenial response." Id. at 466-67.
94. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Compare Act approved Feb. 8, 1988, ch.
88-1, § 10, 1988 FLA. Sass. LAW SERV. 1 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 455.2415).
The Florida statute does not impose a duty to warn or take precautions. Rather, it allows an
exception to confidentiality when a patient "engaged in a treatment relationship with a
psychiatrist.., has made an actual threat to physically harm an identifiable victim or victims"
and the psychiatrist makes "a clinical judgment that the patient has the apparent capability
to commit such an act and that it is more likely than not that in the near future the patient
will carry out that threat." Id. at 12. In this situation a "psychiatrist may disclose patient
communications to the extent necessary to warn any potential victim or to communicate the
threat to a law enforcement agency." Id.
95. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 457, 551 P.2d at 358, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 38. See also supra
text accompanying notes 29-35.
96. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987).
97. Mni. STAT. ANN. § 148.975(4) (West Supp. 1988).
98. Indiana's statute may be the only exception. See infra note 134.
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ableness used to judge the professional's determination of the patient's
dangerous disposition. If a professional applying the standard of the pro-
fession with reasonable care would find that the patient poses a serious
danger of violence to others, the duty to protect third party potential victims
arises. 99 The statutes, on the other hand, determine when the duty arises by
looking to the actions of the patient, not the reasonableness of the profes-
sional. The patient must communicate a threat before a professional has
any duty to take precautions to protect a third party. Under the statutory
scheme, therefore, it is no longer an issue whether a professional should
have predicted violence by the patient. Rather, if the patient makes a threat,
the duty arises independently of the operation of a legal standard of
professional reasonableness. 6
Third, the language of the statutes apparently does away with the rea-
sonableness test used in Tarasoff to evaluate the professional's choice of
the type of action necessary to discharge the duty.'°0 The statutes specifically
prescribe alternative actions which may discharge the duty, including warning
the victim or the police, or both.101 In Indiana the professional may discharge
the duty by performing one or more of five actions. This is significant.
Under the statutes which give a choice to the professional, the choice of
which action to take appears to be within the discretion of the professional.
Unlike Tarasoff, the statutes have no explicit provision for reviewing whether
the professional made a negligent choice between types of actions to
discharge the duty under the circumstances. 12
Reviewing the facts of Tarasoff will clarify the importance of this differ-
ence. In Tarasoff, the defendants originally called the police to have their
patient detained. The police did not detain him because he appeared rational
and promised to stay away from the woman he had threatened to kill.
According to the court, the psychotherapists' actions were nonetheless
subject to review to determine whether they had done all that was reasonably
99. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
100. All of the statutes still require "reasonable efforts" to fulfill the statutory requirements
of warning or informing the police. See supra note 4. However, this list of choices is still
much clearer and more specific about what type of actions are required to discharge the duty.
The apparent statutory inquiry into the sufficiency of the professional's action is much narrower
than under the Tarasoff line of cases, which requires any type of action which is "reasonably
necessary under the circumstances" without differentiating or specifying types of actions to
guide the professional. But see CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987) (requiring "other
appropriate action" when necessary); infra text accompanying notes 136-38.
101. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
102. This is not to say that the statutes do not require reasonable efforts in carrying out
the types of actions enumerated by the statutes. See supra notes 87, 100. Moreover, although
the statutes have no explicit standard regarding the professional's choice of actions to discharge
the duty, see infra note 138 and accompanying text for an argument that they are open to an
interpretation requiring a reasonableness test governing this choice.
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necessary to protect the woman from the threat. 0 3 On the other hand,
under some of the current statutes a notification to either the police or the
potential victim would discharge the duty. Under such a statute, the defen-
dants in Tarasoff might have prevailed. Having notified the police, they
would not have been liable for not taking other action to protect the woman
as needed under the circumstances. Moreover, under any of the other
statutes which require notification of both the police and the victim, the
therapists would have known beforehand that a call to the victim or her
family was also required. Presuming that they had followed such a clear
command, their action might not have been subject to a further test of
reasonableness and may have protected them from liability. Thus, regarding
the sufficiency of warnings and precautions, the statutes act as a limitation
of mental health professionals' liability for the violent acts of their patients.
Finally, most of the statutes retain something like the reasonably or
readily identifiable victim standard to determine whether the duty to warn
or take precautions arises. °4 In these states, a reasonableness rule must still
be used to determine if the duty arises. Even in the face of threats by the
patient, the statutory duty will not arise unless the potential victim is
reasonably or readily identifiable.
II. THE REASONS FOR CODIFICATION
Codification of the Tarasoff duty to warn or take precautions shows a
recognition of the concerns voiced by Justice Clark in his Tarasoff dissent.
"The issue whether effective treatment for the mentally ill should be
sacrificed to a system of warnings is ... properly one for the Legislature,"
according to Justice Clark. 0 5 As a response to Tarasoff and the common
law development of its rule, °s the statutes imply a number of legislative
decisions.
103. The court reached this result despite the fact that the therapists' action was sufficient
under statutes in effect at that time. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 457, 551 P.2d at 358, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 38 (Clark, J., dissenting).
104. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
105. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 452, 551 P.2d 334,
355, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 35 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting).
106. Statutes are often read as legislative responses to the common law. See, e.g., Ashlock
v. Norris, 475 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (Ind. App. 1985). Legislative correction is one undertaking
called for by critics of the Tarasoff decision. See Meyers, The Legal Perils of Psychotherapeutic
Practice (Part II): Coping with Hediund and Jablonski, 12 J. OF PsycmATRY AND L. 39, 46
(1984). Much of the tort reform undertaken in the late 1970s was by legislation. See generally
Tort Reform and Related Proposals: Annotated Bibliographies on Product Liability and Medical
Malpractice, 1979 A.B.A. SEC. INS., NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. SPECLAL CoMMIrrTEE TO STUDY
TnE TORT Sys. (B. Levin & R. Coyne eds.) [hereinafter ABA BmuooRPmas].
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A. Policy Implications of Codification
First, the immunity provisions of the statutes are a means of solving the
"manifestly unfair" position which Justice Clark argued that professionals
face under the Tarasoff rule.'0 7 The immunity provisions provide a legal
defense for professionals who reveal confidential information in order to
fulfill their duty to protect persons other than their patients. By providing
a legislative response, the statutes also prevent a conflict between the judicial
and legislative branches as to the proper weights to be accorded the
competing interests of confidentiality, public safety and professional liability.
Thus, professionals faced with violent threats by their patients need no
longer fear that they will have to defend in court their choice between a
Tarasoff duty to disclose and a statutory duty to keep confidentiality.
Through immunity clauses, these statutes explicitly reconcile the duty to
keep confidentiality and the duty to warn or take precautions. 08
Second, the statutes reflect no common legislative judgment about what
actions should fulfill the duty to warn or take precautions. Some statutes
require specific actions or a combination of actions, while others leave to
the professional an apparent choice among enumerated options. In addition,
some statutes require any other action appropriate to the circumstances.'0 9
Third, the statutes implicitly address the spectre of a "net increase in
violence" under the Tarasoff rule. Although Justice Clark suggested that
this would result from patients being reluctant to talk freely with mental
health professionals who may have a legal duty to reveal their confidence," 0
it may also result from a fear of liability on the part of the mental health
professional. Healing mental illness is unlike healing physical disease. Once
treatment is undertaken, physical healing may take place with or without
revelation of confidences. In psychiatric care, on the contrary, revelation
of a patient's violent thoughts may undo all of the healing which has taken
107. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 457, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 38 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of the immunity clauses of these statutes, see supra text accom-
panying notes 94-97.
108. The California and Washington statutes are exceptions. See supra note 63 and accom-
panying text.
109. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
110. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 459, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). See also Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard
Society, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 358 (1976). Stone argues that patients who are perceived as
dangerous already receive good treatment only rarely, and after Tarasoff will get even less
because of the vagueness of the duty and psychotherapists' fear of liability. See also Melella,
supra note 3, at 111 (arguing that placing broad liability on psychotherapists for the sexual
assaults of their patients could ultimately "defeat the rationale for which the courts had
originally created third-party liability, namely, the protection of potential victims from harm").
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place up to that point."' As one commentator puts it, "The extent of the
protection of confidentiality in any jurisdiction may, to a large extent,
determine who can be treated."' 12 Patients who are warned that there are
substantial limits to confidentiality may not be sufficiently confident to
release hostility in the form of verbal threats and may miss an opportunity
to prevent violent acts by verbal release of this hostility."3 In any event,
studies have suggested that some patients have ceased psychiatric care when
informed of the potential limits of confidentiality after Tarasoff,14 and the
uncertainty of the Tarasoff rule has tempted some psychiatrists to avoid
delving into areas of potential violence with their patients.," In any case,
the statutes reflect a legislative judgment that the indirect cost of a potential
increase in violence by breaching confidentiality is outweighed by the benefit
of requiring protective action when threats are communicated to therapists.
More generally, the statutes reflect a legislative balance of the interests
of professionals, patients and victims. The statutes stand as a codification
of when and upon whom a duty to warn should be imposed and how that
duty should be discharged. The variations among the statutes reveal different
priorities among the legislatures regarding who should be subject to a duty
to warn, the type of threats which will activate the duty, the required
identiflability of the potential victims, and the actions which will discharge
the duty." 6 Notwithstanding these differences, the statutes reveal similar
judgments among these legislatures about the relative costs and benefits of
111. See Merton, supra note 5, at 305. There is also a sense in which breaches of
confidentiality may threaten the healing of physical illness as well, especially where stigma
attaches to the illness, as in the case of AIDS or genetic maladies, as well as mental illness.
However, this threat blocks physical healing by preventing treatment from ever beginning, and
not by physiologically blocking the action of medications or other treatments. Mental illness,
on the other hand, not only may never be treated if confidentiality is not ensured and well
protected, but may also worsen if revelations are made and the resultant shame or fear of
exposure prevents further releases of hostility or itself causes a regression.
112. See Melella, supra note 3, at 95.
113. "The potential for third-party liability for the psychotherapist, and criminal liability
on the part of the patient, may be so great as to preclude some offenders from obtaining
treatment." Id. at 95.
114. See Merton, supra note 5, at 313. Compare Melella, supra note 3, at 95. The authors
stated that while some consider absolute confidentiality critical to successful therapy, they
found in an outpatient clinical research program that informing patients of the limitations of
confidentiality had "not prevented most offenders from reporting ... their deviant sexual
behavior." Id. However, the authors admitted that "there is no sure way of determining
whether these offenders would have been more candid had we been able to guarantee complete
confidentiality." Id.
115. Melella argues that if broad liability is found by courts, "many psychotherapists, upon
realizing that they were treating inherently dangerous patients, might act defensively to avoid
assuming the risk for such patient liability either by attempting to discourage treatment or by
referring the patients to less legally sophisticated colleagues." Id. at 110. But see Empirical
Study, supra note 20 (arguing that their survey shows that Tarasoff has not discouraged
therapists from treating dangerous patients).
116. See supra notes 64-93 and accompanying text.
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public safety and confidentiality, the effects of mandatory disclosure and
the exposure of mental health professionals to liability based on their
patients' actions. These statutes define limits to the circumstances of liability
which are both more specific and more narrow than the circumstances of
liability under the Tarasoff line of cases.11 7 They reflect a legislative decision
to limit the liability of mental health professionals to the more clearly
enumerated and specified conditions of the statutes."'
Much has been written about the ill effects of the potentially vast liability
under the rationale of Tarasoff."9 The amount of liability is made more
troublesome by the confusion about what circumstances trigger the duty
under the common law progeny of Tarasoff.20 Moreover, although the
Tarasoff line of cases claims to impose a standard of professional reason-
ableness by which to measure a psychotherapist's prognosis of violence,
there is much dispute over whether anyone can predict violence by a mentally
ill person.' 2' This places not only triers of fact, but also the professionals
themselves, in the position of guessing about what reasonably should be
foreseen. 122
This guesswork is particularly onerous in the case of violence by mental
health patients because an essential element of the negligence calculus is
missing, or at least hotly contested. Negligence is typically found where the
cost of precautions to prevent a loss is less than the loss discounted by the
probability of that loss.2 3 In the case of violence by mental health patients,
a viable method of determining the probability of loss, Le., the predictability
of an attack by the patient, has not yet been accepted, even by the
professionals themselves. 24
117. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
118. Frequently, the imposition of a legal duty is regarded as a decision about public policy.
See Annotation, supra note 7, at 624. Public policy and legislative intent, as found in a
statute's plain language, are sometimes used as factors to decide the extent of a statutory
duty. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 517 (1982).
119. See supra notes 3, 10 and accompanying text. See Melella, supra note 3. Melella argues
that broad liability for psychotherapists may require that they commit or confine patients with
a history or tendency of sexual assault in order to avoid liability for their patients' violent
acts. "This action would preclude preventive remedial treatment, while overburdening insti-
tutions with already scarce resources." Id.
120. See Melefla, supra note 3. See also supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. The uncertainty and unpredictability
have also been blamed for forcing professional liability insurance rates higher. See supra note
60.
123. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (stating that a "duty
... to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability
[of loss]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury ... ; (3) the burden of adequate precautions").
See also PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 7, § 43, at 296 (stating that "the American
formula . . . balanc[es] magnitude of risk and gravity of harm against utility of conduct").
124. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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The statutes attempt to remedy this problem of uncertainty by removing
the doubtful legal standard-what a reasonable professional would have
predicted in this situation-and specifying what actions by the patient will
cause the duty to arise. Thus, the statutes address the concerns voiced by
Justice Mosk'25 and by psychiatrists about the absence of a professional
standard of prediction.' The statutes present a specific guide to determine
whether the professional must take precautionary action. If a threat has
been communicated, the professional must take the statutorily prescribed
action. Through this specificity, the statutes raise the predictability of the
law and may relieve upward pressure on insurance rates for professionals.
Moreover, the simplicity of the statutes goes beyond the rule proposed by
Justice Mosk. His rule depends upon the professional's action: The psychi-
atrist must actually make a prediction of dangerousness. 77 The statutory
rule, however, depends solely on affirmative action by the patient: The
patient must communicate a threat to the mental health service profes-
sional.lu
B. Preemption by the Statutes
A myriad of interests must inform a professional's decision to break
confidentiality in order to warn or protect a person other than a patient.
A professional must consider the patient's interest in confidentiality and
reputation, the safety of the public and the potential victims, and the
professional's own exposure to liability. As discussed above, the statutes
reveal a legislative balance of these interests and imply legislative decisions
about public policy, social experience, predictability and fairness.
Although the statutes have preemptory language, the extent to which they
preempt the common law Tarasoff line of cases is unclear. And although
neither of the two reasonableness tests mandated by the Tarasoff line of
cases is explicitly present in the statutes, 2 9 it is not clear that both must be
125. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 450-52, 551 P.2d at 353-54, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 33-34 (Mosk,
J., concurring and dissenting); Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 707-10, 669 P.2d
41, 48-50, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805, 812-14 (1983) (Mosk, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 22-
28, 53-54 and accompanying text.
126. See AM. PsYciHiAnuc A. TASK FORCE, supra note 23; Merton, supra note 5.
127. See supra note 54 (discussing a possible ambiguity in Justice Mosk's statement of his
own rule).
128. Justice Mosk's proposed rule-an actual prediction of violence-leaves open the pos-
sibility that a professional may avoid liability merely by refusing to make a prediction of
violence in the face of a patient's threats. In contrast, this loophole is not available under the
statutes. When a patient manifests certain behavior, the professional must respond regardless
of whether the professional makes a prognosis of violent behavior in response. See supra notes
98-99 and accompanying text. However, the statutes still leave a practical gap in that
psychotherapists may attempt to avoid their potential liability by engaging in therapy which is
calculated to avoid occasions in which the patient may communicate a threat.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
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preempted by the statutes. The statutes modify the common law approach
of the Tarasoff line of cases, and therefore are in derogation of the common
law. Typically, statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly
construed so that there is a limited preemption of the common law. 30
Moreover, questions about the statutes' preemptive reach should be resolved
in light of the implied legislative balance struck between the competing
interests.
1. The Prediction Test
The first of the Tarasoff reasonableness tests-the reasonableness of the
mental health professional's prediction of a patient's violent behavior-is
the more controversial. 3 ' The test is difficult to apply, and the difficulty
stems in part from the logically prior controversy over whether a standard
exists by which to judge a professional's prediction of violent behavior. 13 2
In its place, the statutes prescribe a test for liability for a failure to warn
or take precautions based on statutorily enumerated circumstances. These
circumstances have to do with actions by the patient, not the reasonableness
of the professional's predictive response. 33 The switch from one kind of
test (professional reasonableness) to a wholly different kind of test which
is easier to apply (specifically enumerated actions by a patient) suggests an
intent to replace completely the Tarasoff prediction test with the statutory
conditions. Moreover, the statutory language also supports a reading which
completely preempts the reasonableness test from a determination of liability
under the statutes. According to the statutes, liability arises only in the
enumerated circumstances, without regard to the reasonableness of the
professional's response. 134
130. 15A C.J.S. Common Law § 12 (1967) (stating that statutory "alteration or repeal will
not be considered effected to a greater extent than the unmistakable import of the language
used").
131. As discussed above, many psychiatrists dispute whether the profession can predict a
patient's behavior. See supra note 23. Moreover, most professionals have little control over
their patients, lacking any legal ability to confine them. Although the element of psychiatrists'
control over their patients played a part in the Tarasoff decision, see 17 Cal. 3d at 435-36,
551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23, some suggest that even psychiatrists lack any effective
custody or control over outpatients who are the subject of the vast majority of these cases.
See Melella, supra note 3, at 97; Schopp & Quattrocchi, supra note 10, at 27. There have also
been questions about why the psychiatrists were held liable in Tarasoff but not the police
when law enforcement agents have a "power to restrain the liberty of the 'dangerous' person
[which] exceeds that of any therapist." Merton, supra note 5, at 296.
132. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
134. See supra note 4. The Indiana formula does not clearly preempt the reasonableness
test of a professional's prediction. In Indiana, the statute contains a clause creating the duty
even when the patient "evidences conduct or makes statements indicating an imminent danger"
of harm to others. The statute does not specify to whom the conduct or statements must
[Vol. 64:391
LIABILITY-LIMITING STATUTES
Doing aw~y with this first reasonableness test has the further advantage
of avoiding the necessity of different standards for each type of professional
covered by the same statute. It would also end the creation of nonexistent
standards to which Justice Mosk objected'35 by limiting the duty to more
clearly identifiable occasions. This is especially important for professions
covered by these statutes, such as nursing, which do not have even a
reputation of predictive capability.
Thus, the statutory language and the underlying legislative balance of the
competing interests favor restricting the potential liability under the common
law approach of Tarasoff and finding liability only under the more clear
and predictable statutory terms.
2. The Reaction and Identifiability Tests
On the other hand, the second Tarasoff reasonableness test-governing
the professional's choice of action in the face of a violent threat-does not
present the controversy of the test of a professional's predictive response.
The task of warning or taking precautions against a person's violent behavior
presupposes no particular professional skill or training. The same is true
for the reasonably identifiable victim test. Neither standard is fraught with
the conceptual and application disputes to which Justice Mosk and psy-
chotherapists object. 13 6 Any person faced with a threat which triggers the
statutory duty could be expected to choose a reasonable response to the
threat to protect an identifiable person.
The absence of a specified test in those statutes which leave a choice to
the professional among actions to discharge the duty does not necessarily
preempt the use of a reasonableness test to judge whether the professional's
warning or precaution was adequate. The language of the statutes is not
clearly preemptive. All of the statutes require reasonable efforts to carry
out the specified action, but some require appropriate action not limited to
the statutory list. The language of some of the statutes requires the profes-
sional to take all of the enumerated actions. Other statutes give a choice
to the professionals without specifying a test by which to judge this choice.
Within this category are statutes which require the professional to take any
"indicate" an imminent danger that the patient will do violence to others. Presumably, the
mental health service provider must witness the conduct or statements. But conduct may
indicate violent propensities to a psychiatrist and not to a health professional trained in another
specialty. Moreover, the clause does not supply a standard to apply to this issue. See supra
note 61; INDw. CODE AiNr. § 34-4-12.4-2 (West Supp. 1988).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
136. "Reasonably identifiable" or "readily identifiable" can simply be taken as a person
who is identifiable after a "moment's reflection" as determined in Mavroudis v. Superior
Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes
37-40.
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one of the enumerated options in order to fulfill the duty. This raises the
possibility of avoiding liability merely through a pro forma performance of
the alternative most easily fulfilled by the professional, but not reasonably
suited to the circumstances. 137
Requiring a professional to choose reasonably among alternative warnings
or precautions to protect reasonably identifiable persons depending on the
circumstances demands no more from the professional than the reasonable
care required of all persons in carrying out their legal duties. 3 " And since
these legislatures have decided that confidentiality must be broken in some
circumstances, the breach should be reasonably calculated at least to provide
protection in the circumstances. Moreover, although a reasonable reaction
test would demand no more from the professional, it would frustrate an
escape from liability through a pro forma response to a patient's threat.
This, in turn, would help assure the best choice among the safeguards
minimally required by the legislatures.
Thus, effective and efficient use of the statutory alternatives requires,
and the language of the statutes permits, that a reasonableness test be
maintained by which to determine the sufficiency of the professional's
discharge of the duty and whether the victim was sufficiently identifiable
for the duty to arise.
III. A PROPOSAL
Since these statutes are intended to displace the common law Tarasoff
line of cases, a formulation should be used which better encompasses the
policy terms discussed above. A suggested formulation is set out below. It
incorporates terms of various statutes already enacted which help to delineate
clearly what circumstances will trigger the duty.
137. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
138. See Hedlund, 34 Cal. 3d at 708-10, 669 P.2d at 49, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 813-14 (Mosk,
J., dissenting) ("Since it is not the medical care or treatment of a patient that is involved [in
warning another], but a species of civilian duty that has arisen to a third party, the acts or
omissions of the doctors are not malpractice, but simple negligence."). See also PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 7, § 56 (stating that where the duty to protect others from
third persons does exist, the obligation is not an absolute one to insure the plaintiff's safety,
but requires only that the defendant exercise reasonable care). But see Hedlund, 34 Cal. 3d
at 703, 669 P.2d at 45, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 809 (the majority holding that "the manner in which
the warning is given may also involve professional judgment").
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Mental Health Professionals' Liability for the Violent Acts of Patients
Section 1. A mental health professional is immune from liability to
persons other than a patient for failing to predict or warn or take
precautions to protect from a patient's violent behavior, unless
A) the patient communicates a threat to the mental health
professional, and
B) the threat is coupled with the apparent intent and ability
to carry out the threat
that the patient will use physical violence or other means of harm to
cause serious personal injury or death to reasonably identifiable persons.
Section 2. Regardless of any other provision of law, a mental health
professional's duty to warn or take precautions arises only under the
limited circumstances described in section 1.
Section 3. A mental health professional's duty to warn of or take
precautions to protect another from the threatened violence of a patient
is discharged by the mental health professional giving a warning or
taking precautionary actions such as
A) communicating the threat to the potential victim or victims,
B) informing a law enforcement agency having jurisdiction in
the patient's or victim's place of residence,
C) seekinj civil commitment of the patient,or
D) any other actions,
provided that the action which the professional takes is reasonably suited
to the circumstances. The professional to whom a threat is communicated
may also discharge the duty under section 1 by informing a person
designated by the professional's employer as the individual who has the
responsibility to warn or take precautions.
Section 4. A mental health professional is immune from liability under
state statutes which protect patient privacy and confidentiality for actions
taken in good faith to discharge the duty which has arisen or may have
arisen under section 1.
Because of the controversy over the existence of a standard to judge the
prediction of violence by mental health professionals, the proposed statute
limits the circumstances of liability to specific, clearly recognizable situations
based on patient actions. By including the Louisiana clause requiring an
apparent intent and ability to carry out the violent threat,'3 9 it also seeks
to ensure that as few breaches of confidence are made as possible. The
proposed statute retains two reasonableness tests. It requires that a potential
victim be reasonably identifiable before a duty to warn or take precautions
arises. It also places the choice of which type of action to take to discharge
the duty within a reasonable person's experience by requiring the profes-
sional to choose a reasonably suited action. Following the Indiana statute,
the model includes a provision whereby an employer of mental health
professionals may designate one person as the individual responsible for
139. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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determining whether a duty has arisen under the statute and what actions
are required to discharge that duty.1'4 The proposed statute makes clear
that reasonable care is required in response to a communicated threat, not
necessarily a warning.' 4' Like the Minnesota statute, the proposal grants
immunity from liability for disclosures made in good faith when there is a
close question about whether the statutory duty has arisen.1 42 Finally, the
suggested formulation includes in section 2 a clause clearly manifesting the
statute's preemptory intent.
CONCLUSION
Considerations of public policy, predictability and legislative reform man-
date that the statutes discussed in this Note be interpreted as limiting the
extensive potential liability which professionals face under the Tarasoff line
of cases. By determining whether there is a duty to warn or take precautions
based on patient actions rather than under a doubtful and ambiguous
standard, the statutes provide a scheme by which courts and, more impor-
tantly, professionals can more readily determine when there is a duty to
warn or take precautions to safeguard identifiable victims. Nonetheless, the
statutes should be interpreted to retain a reasonableness standard by which
to determine the adequacy of the professional's response to a threat.
Whether the courts will so read the statutes and public policy is yet to be
seen.
EPILOGUE
The question whether the judicial expansion and subsequent legislative
limitation of the Tarasoff rules yield any insight about handling affirmative
duties in the future will now be addressed. The difficulties of dealing with
affirmative duties are recurring because "as our ideas of human relations
change the law as to duties changes with them."'' 43 Therefore, if a lesson
is present and discernible in the history of the Tarasoff duty, learning that
lesson may save society the trouble of repeating Tarasoff's meandering
course.
AIDS and genetics are two areas in which "our ideas of human relations"
are currently being reevaluated. Both present conflicts of rights and interests
140. For a discussion of the Indiana provision, see supra notes 92-93 and accompanying
text.
141. See supra note 20 for a discussion of what may be a prevailing confusion among
mental health practitioners over whether a warning, as opposed to other types of action, is
required by the Tarasoff duty.
142. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
143. PROSSER AND KEETON ON ToRTs, supra note 7, § 53.
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much like the controversy presented in the Tarasoff line of cases. Given its
fatality rate, contagiousness, and associated stigma, AIDS presents a myriad
of situations in which conflicts arise among confidentiality, protection of
third parties from harm, and standards of professional conduct. An im-
mediate issue is whether one with knowledge of another's exposure ought
to have a duty to inform third parties at risk. 44 Similarly, advancing
capabilties of genetic diagnosis present genetic counselors and patients with
new knowledge about genetic risks. 45 This knowledge implicates stigma,
confidentiality concerns and potential third-party victims. Here also is the
issue of whether one with knowledge ought to have a duty to inform others
at risk, such as spouses outside of the counseling relationship who could
legally be obligated to care for offspring. It is clear that both AIDS and
genetics will involve more and more people in conflicts about third-party
risk. 46
What is new in the cases of AIDS and genetic counseling is that society
already knows, though controversies are as yet infrequent, some of the
issues which will be encountered. Moreover, unlike predicting violence by
mentally ill patients, there is no phantom standard of prognosis with which
to contend in the cases of AIDS and genetics. Geneticists often deal with
known probabilities of the potential genetic makeup of offspring. 147 Simi-
larly, AIDS is commonly known to have a very high, if not total, fatality
rate. And although rates of transmission are less well known, they are
generally accepted to be high among risk groups. 4
As shown above, however, there is no generally accepted standard among
mental health professionals by which to judge a professional's prognosis of
violent activity. 49 Thus, an essential factor of the negligence calculus is
missing, and this prevents professionals from accurately evaluating alter-
native courses of action. 50 In response to this absence of an acknowledged
standard, ten legislatures have imposed a blanket duty to warn or take
precautions which is triggered by specific patient actions. This reflects an
implicit judgment that, in the absence of a recognized standard by which
to predict violence, the costs and benefits of a rule requiring protective
action in the face of communicated threats are more favorable to society
144. For an example of such a conflict, see supra note 75.
145. See generally J. FLETCHER, COPING wrrH GENETIC DIsoRDERs: A GUIDE FOR CLERGY
AND PARENTs (1982) (outlining capabilities of modem genetics and potential responses by
counselors).
146. See M. BAYLES, REPRODUCTIVE ETHIcs 42 (1984); Fineberg, The Social Dimensions of
AIDS, Sci. AM., Oct. 1988, at 128, 131.
147. See J. FLETCHER, supra note 145, at 4-32.
148. Heyward & Curran, The Epidemiology of AIDS in the U.S., SC. Am., Oct. 1988, at
72, 75, 79-80.
149. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
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than operating under a standard which is not widely recognized, if it exists
at all.
Reviewing the history of the Tarasoff duty, it may be tempting to argue
that an initial legislative decision is needed to prevent society from retracing
this wandering path in the cases of AIDS and genetics. Prospective legislative
decisions may help persons plan their actions so as to avoid liability. 5' This
course may be especially tempting given the prevalence of legislative attempts
at tort reform since the late 1970s.152 However, because of the differences
between current ability to predict violence by the mentally ill, on the one
hand, and current knowledge about AIDS and genetics, on the other, such
a route is not required and would be ill-advised.
The prognostic capabilities of health professionals regarding AIDS and
genetic maladies are much better and more widely recognized than the
abilities of mental health professionals to predict violent behavior by their
patients. Unlike the case of predicting violence by mental health patients,
there are much clearer standards of predictability in the fields of AIDS and
genetics by which professionals can judge the risk of danger which their
patients may pose to third parties. Thus, professionals dealing with AIDS
and genetics are more capable of determining the requirements of reasonable
care in their respective fields. Consequently, a coherent professional standard
like that on which courts traditionally rely is available to help discern in
what circumstances, if any, affirmative duties to third parties ought to be
found for health professionals in the fields of AIDS and genetics. Given
the presence of clear standards by which to judge a professional prognosis
in the cases of AIDS and genetics, much of the justification for legislative
intrusion like the Tarasoff statutes is gone. Rather, courts should be left
unimpeded in their case by case exploration of what reasonable care requires
of professionals working in the fields of AIDS and genetics.
MICHAEL R. GEsKE
151. For an example of how previously legislated duties may have prevented the dispute in
Tarasoff, see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
152. See ABA BmLioGaAPms, supra note 106.
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